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Abstract— Low-power wide-area networks (LPWAN) technologies,
such as LoRaWAN, have become a popular and cost-effective way
of monitoring assets. Two considerations which still present a
barrier to deployment are the cost of deployment and the potential
cost and disruption of re-keying a compromised network. This loss
of functionality from a compromised network has made security
conscious industries reluctant to embrace LPWAN technology. This
paper will address these concerns by simplifying the deployment
and re-keying of LoRaWAN devices, by detailing a procedure which
uses a smartphone’s camera flash to transfer the necessary creden-
tials. Smartphones were chosen as a transfer mechanism since they
are both abundant and suitably powerful to generate and transfer
secure keys. Using smartphones and light also removes the need for a laptop, a wired connection and programming
software, allowing devices to be provisioned out in the field without the need for calibration or specialised tools. The
design was created and successfully programs sensor devices in variety of environments, and has demonstrated benefits
to critical national infrastructure industries such as utilities.
Index Terms— Internet of Things, Security, LoRaWAN, Consumer Devices, Smart Grid
I. INTRODUCTION
LORAWAN is a low-power wide-area network (LPWAN)which operates in the 868 MHz license-free frequency
band and has become a popular choice for organisations
wanting to deploy a cost-effective wireless sensor network. It
benefits from an extensive ecosystem and considerable security
research to find and resolve any potential flaws [1]. The
devices themselves secure communication using symmetric
cryptography, which requires both parties to know a shared key
before any secure communication can commence. Therefore,
a secure key-exchange must take place so that both parties
have the same key. This creates two issues: (1) a suitably
random key must be generated. (2) The key must be securely
transferred to both the LoRaWAN device and LoRaWAN
application server. Standalone LoRaWAN devices cannot gen-
erate suitably random keys [2], instead the device installer
must generate a key to be installed into the device. This
creates a barrier for organisations which either do not have
this capability or knowledge. Security organisation IO Active
recently detailed that LoRaWAN networks, in particular, are
susceptible to insecure deployments due to a lack of under-
standing from organisations deploying the these networks [3].
In their findings they detailed that as LoRaWAN is advertised
as secure by default, consumers believe no customization is
required, thereby using default or easily guessable credentials.
The second issue is key transfer. High powered devices such
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as smartphones or personal computers avoid these problems by
using public key infrastructure (PKI) to setup a secure channel,
which is then used to transfer a shared secret [4]. This shared
secret is then used to secure all messages between the device
and the server. Although it is possible for LPWAN networks
to support PKI, it is uncommon with only one commercial
offering, due to the battery consumption and resource utilisa-
tion of such an operation. Therefore, the device installer must
securely transfer the generated key to the LoRaWAN device,
and to the corresponding application server.
Members of the LoRa alliance have attempted to resolve
this dependency by creating pre-programmed modules with
matching credentials which can be transferred to the new
owner. However, this still presents two issues. The third party
must be trusted to correctly generate, store, transfer, and
subsequently delete the keys once they had been issued to
the device owner. Security-conscious organisations such as
critical national infrastructure (CNI) are held accountable for
their suppliers [5]. Therefore, without oversight into how a
third party programs their devices, CNI organisations would
be unwise to select this option. The second issue is that if
the network was compromised, the devices would have to
be recalled and sent back to the manufacturer [6], a costly
operation in terms of finances, labour, and loss of functionality.
One such CNI is the electricity distribution network. Al-
though telemetry is currently fairly limited, with the intro-
duction of smart grid this will rapidly expand. As such,
LoRaWAN is being investigated in this role by members of
the University of Strathclyde’s Power Network Demonstration
Centre (PNDC), a smart grid testing facility [7]. Even if
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LoRaWAN devices are used only for measurement and not
directly for control, if sensor networks are compromised the
resulting readings will cause the network management to make
false decisions. High-quality security in such networks is
therefore essential, even when the distributed nature of such
networks makes deployment difficult and costly. Moreover,
electrical networks must be highly reliable and a loss of
functionality would be highly detrimental and be a laborious
process to replace each of the thousands of deployed devices
for re-keying. Therefore, this paper will investigate a way
to simplify installing shared keys into low-cost LoRaWAN
devices, without relying on third parties.
II. BACKGROUND
Using the recommended Over-The-Air-Activation (OTAA)
procedure LoRaWAN 1.0, currently the most widely deployed
version [1], requires an Application Key (AppKey), an Appli-
cation Identification (AppEUI) and a Unique Device Identifier
(DevEUI) to be present in both the application server and
the device before the device can join the network [1]. This
AppKey is used as a seed to generate an Application Session
Key (AppSKey), and a Network Session Key (NwkSKey). The
application layer uses the AppSKey to encrypt the payload of
the message and ensuring data privacy, while the NwkSKey
is responsible for authenticating messages [?]. Given all en-
cryption and authentication in the network is derived from the
AppKey, the security of communication is dependent on how
unpredictable these keys are. If the keys were generated in any
deterministic way the whole network could be compromised.
This creates a requirement for random keys, which is a
common problem in the field of computer security, normally
keys are generated, using random data sources, such as the
inherently random nature of human interaction with computers
[8] or non-deterministic sources. A popularised example of this
is a video recording a wall of lava lamps, which creates an
entirely random image [9].
The challenge with low-cost embedded devices, such as
LoRaWAN devices, is that they generally have a single pur-
pose, and little variety in their scheduled tasks to generate
randomness. They also lack human interaction and by default
have no built-in hardware for random number generation.
The original LoRaWAN specification designers required some
random data for the generation of the message authentication
code, but without the capability to create random numbers by
default, they decided to use the received signal strength as a
pseudorandom number generator. However, researchers were
able to influence the received signal strength, and make a fixed
nonce [10]. This demonstrates the complexity of generating
secure random numbers, where even apparently random data
can be influenced.
Various researchers have acknowledged these limitations of
low-cost LPWAN devices, and have proposed several schemes
to generate session keys in alternative ways [11]. Han et.al,
noted that current scheme uses AES electronic codebook
(ECB) to generate session keys from the root AppKey and
through using pattern analysis the static AppKey, could be de-
termined [12]. Consequently, they, proposed a new lightweight
key update scheme to routinely update the AppKey, using a
scheme resistant to this attack [12]. Zhang et.al, also detailed
the challenges of generating secure and unique session keys on
LoRaWAN devices, but instead proposed a new architecture,
where a trusted third party generates the required session
keys [13]. This third party will encrypt the keys using the pre-
existing AppKey, and then transfer the encrypted keys to the
LoRaWAN end device and network server. However, this also
relies on a pre-shared key to encrypt the session keys while
in transit. However, both methods required the installation of
a pre-shared key on the device and the application server.
This reliance of a pre-existing key for low-cost devices
is a common one, Xu et.al, noted as these devices do not
support public key infrastructure they are dependent on a
pre-installed key [14]. In response a new research field has
emerged, physical layer key generation, where undetectable
information is shared between the communicating parties
to generate a shared key [13], [14]. Zhang et.al, and Xu
et.al, proposed using LoRaWAN’s received signal strength
parameter as shared knowledge between the gateway and the
device [13], [14]. Both sets of results show they were able
to successfully generate a key between the end device and
the gateway. However, as the key is generated on gateway
and the end device, this invalidates the end-to-end encryption
model of LoRaWAN, making the gateway a target for potential
attackers. Xu et.al, also noted that an adversary listening to this
information exchange could impersonate a legitimate actor and
disrupt the key exchange protocol [14]. Consequently, Xu pro-
posed including a message authentication code, which would
require a pre-shared key. Therefore, each proposal requires a
pre-shared key. Adding additional hardware to a LoRaWAN
device, such as a physically unclonable function, or a hardware
security module would allow for random number generation,
and therefore key generation and transfer. However, this
creates a barrier requiring additional hardware which would
increase the cost of the device. IoT devices are price sensitive,
and even a small increase in cost deters consumers [15],
[16]. Manufacturers also struggle to differentiate themselves
based on security features so instead invest in more marketable
features [17]. One industry which is particularly price sensitive
is the utility industry.
The regulated nature of utilities makes it challenging to
invest in security, as expenditure has to be pre-allocated in
eight year blocks, and difficulties in measuring the outcomes
of security projects [18], [19], means that security is often
only added on as sub-goal of larger projects [20]. Regulatory
bodies are also often unwilling to allow for increased costs
for security, arguing that they expect the networks to be
secure by default. This creates strict financial constraints for
utilities to spend on security, meaning that little additional
cost could be added to a device, particularly as this cost
would be replicated many times for a large deployment.
Another constraint for utility companies is that devices are
expected to be operational for decades, while advances in
quantum computing may render most existing implementations
of public key cryptography unusable, while systematic systems
are still regarded as quantum safe [21].
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III. CONCEPT
To reduce the cost of a LoRaWAN deployment while
delivering high security, a system is proposed which uses
a smartphone as the basis for deployment. The smartphone
will generate all the required security credentials for the
LoRaWAN device and transfer them to the device and the
application server. Smartphones were chosen as they are
widely available, powerful, understandable, and in general
more robust than laptops [22]. Moreover, they are capable of
setting up secure TLS connections so that the generated cre-
dentials are securely transferred to the LoRaWAN application
server. Transferring the credentials to the device itself is more
challenging. Smartphones are fitted with an array of interfaces
such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and NFC. However, by default, these
devices do not feature on LoRaWAN sensor devices. Therefore
additional receiving hardware would be required to receive the
credentials using any of these interfaces, incurring additional
manufacturing cost. Moreover, new radio devices must be
tested and certified before they can be advertised and sold on
the market [23]; a costly and time-intensive process. Instead,
using a smartphone’s LED camera flash is proposed. Messages
are encoded using the flash and received by a light sensor on
the LoRaWAN device, using a morse code-esque system.
One issue with this proposal is the communication is unidi-
rectional, where the LoRaWAN device can only receive data.
Hence, the device cannot respond once the credentials entry
is complete. Although some sensor devices have status LEDs
or similar, which could be used to signal the receipt of the
credentials, many do not. Instead, the mobile application sub-
scribes to the LoRaWAN application server, to be alerted once
the device has successfully joined the LoRaWAN network,
completing the process. The result is that the only additional
hardware required for provisioning is a very low-cost light
sensor both in terms of financial and energy consumption.
Consequently, the proposed solution is described as follows.
The smartphone first receives the AppEUI from the deploy-
ment organisation’s server over HTTP. This can be done in
advance of an actual deployment as these credentials are not
device-specific. Next, the smartphone generates the AppKey
and transfers both credentials to the sensor device, along with
any other required credentials. The smartphone then sets up
a secure session to the LoRaWAN application server using
TLS, to transfer the matching credentials to the server. Finally,
the LoRaWAN device repeatedly sends a join request to the
LoRaWAN application server and, upon successful connection,
the smartphone will be alerted that the process is complete
over cellular internet and will destroy the local copy of the
unique credentials.
This is detailed in Fig. 1 along with the following list of
bullet-points:
1) The smartphone assembles required LoRaWAN creden-
tials, such as AppEUI.
2) The smartphone transfers credentials to the LoRaWAN
device.
3) The smartphone transfers the credentials to the applica-
tion server from the smartphone of a cellular or Wi-Fi
connection.
Fig. 1. LoRaWAN Device Setup Procedure
4) The device initiates a LoRaWAN join request using the
credentials.
5) The smartphone receives an acknowledgement that the
device is successfully connected.
IV. KEY TRANSFER
While most smartphones have an LED camera flash, it is not
intended for transmitting information, so some innovation in
implementation is required. The LED can either be on or off.
Three of the most prominent, yet straightforward transmission
protocols, are On-Off Keying (OOK), Pulse Position Modu-
lation (PPM), and Pulse-width modulation (PWM) [24], [25].
OOK is the simplest transmission method, where the presence
of a pulse represents one value (e.g., ‘1’) and the absence of
a pulse the other (e.g., ‘0’). PMM, on the other hand, uses
the position within a particular time slot to determine the
received value. The downside with this approach is that the
transmitter and the receiver both have to be synchronised so
that the position within the time slot is known. Finally, PWM
uses the duration of the pulse to determine the received value.
As the very accurate timing of the pulse was impossible to
determine, for reasons discussed below PWM was selected.
Possible light sensors are a light-dependent resistor (LDR)
and a phototransistor. Phototransistors are generally cheaper
than LDRs and have a faster response. To confirm these
predicted characteristics, an Android application was created
to periodically toggle the flashlight every 100 ms, and the
phone was directed towards the sensor. The LDR took 40
ms to fully recognise the change in light level, while the
phototransistor only required 10 µs. Given the faster response
time and lower cost of the phototransistor, a phototransistor
was used for the prototype.
The operation of the LED flash on Android smartphones
is controlled through the operating system and is not directly
visible to an installed app, which causes issues with accurate
timing. The first phone tested, a OnePlus 5T, was configured
to have the LED on for 10 ms, but the LED would stay illu-
minated for 16 ms. This prolonged light was fairly constant,
with similar results with the LED being set on for 20, 30 and
50 ms, each resulting in approximately an additional six ms of
recorded light. The app was then moved to to various different
phone models, and each LED response time was measured, as
shown in Table I, they all overran by four, five or six ms.
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Fig. 2. Phototransistor Light Detection from 30ms LED flash
Three further tests were undertaken to confirm that this
behaviour is predictable in all conditions: (1) all other ap-
plications on the phone were closed; (2) assorted common
applications were run; and (3) the periodic sequence of the
light being on and off was replaced with a randomly generated
sequences of on and off pulses, mimicking a randomly gener-
ated AES key. In each case, each illumination was extended
by 4-6 ms. Fig. 2 shows the LED response from the OnePlus
5T, when tasked with flashing an aperiodic sequence, which
shows that the width of the recorded pulse was 36 ms, while
the programmed time for a pulse was 30 ms.
While relatively consistent at approximately 6ms, this delay
was a combination of the response time of the smartphone’s
camera hardware abstraction layer, the Android scheduler,
and how many tasks the phone was undertaking. As the
proposed system was designed to be applicable to a range
of smartphones there were to many variables to rely on this.
Therefore, very accurate timing is not be possible, which
makes OOK and PPM unsuitable; consequently, low rate
PWM was implemented. As two symbols had to be encoded,
each one with a different pulse length, one-third of the
transmission time was devoted to representing a zero, and two-
thirds of the transmission period representing a one. The total
transmission time would have to be suitably larger than the
largest overrun measured, so the overrun would not change
the measured result. A symbol period of 50ms was chosen,
allowing a transmission rate of 20 bit/s, making each third
of a pulse 16.7ms long. This creates a difference in symbols
significantly larger than the expected overrun of 6ms, so that
a symbol could not overrun into the next threshold and be
misinterpreted. Fig. 3 shows the two-thirds pulse has a 17ms
buffer before it would run into the next period. Similarly,
the one-third pulse has a 16ms buffer before it could be
considered a long pulse. Both buffers are more than double
the highest recorded overrun.
0 ms 50 ms 100 ms
16 ms17 ms
Fig. 3. Pulse Width Buffer for Overruns
The Android app was originally programmed to loop
through the message one bit at a time, switch the light to
the corresponding state and then sleep for the duration of the
pulse. However, as the Android system call waited until the
response light was off to return, the overrun time being added
to each system call. This meant that instead of the first symbol
ending at 50 ms, it would end at 56 ms. Therefore, by the
completion of the tenth symbol the elapsed time was 560 ms.
Consequently, the receiver expected 11 symbols to have been
transmitted within this time, while only ten would have been
sent, creating an inconsistency in the sent and received signals,
and as noted this discrepancy would be variable depending
on the hardware. A potential solution would be to extend
transmission time of an individual message until the receiver
had enough redundant data to discard any mismatch, but
this would increase the overall transmission time. The more
effective solution was to modify the Android application to
pre-schedule the toggle instructions so that even if a small error
was introduced, it would not cascade into all of the symbols,
rather it would be rectified on the next symbol. Employing
such a revised system would make the first pulse end at t = 50,
the second at t = 100, and the tenth at t = 500.
Although Android has an Alarm Manager built into the
Android Software Development Kit (SDK) specifically for pe-
riodic tasks, this library is unsuitable for sub-second precision,
as Google opted to let the operating system slightly modify the
pre-scheduled trigger time to optimise battery life better [26].
Instead, an array of Runnable tasks was created, where each
task is staggered to set the corresponding light value based
on the position in the message. This modified configuration
resolves the issue with the first few samples triggering at the
expected time, but a slight linear delay was introduced after the
first flash. This was due to the time taken to execute the loop,
causing each subsequent iteration to be set slightly after the
correct time. To resolve this issue, the algorithm was modified
to subtract the time taken to execute the loop as shown in
Equation 1.
delay = (50× (1+ index))− (starttime− looptime)+4 (1)
V. IMPLEMENTATION
To test the light key transfer solution, a Printed Circuit
Board (PCB) featuring a phototransistor, a MSP430FR6989
microcontroller and a LoRaWAN module was created Fig. 4.
On start-up, the MSP430 was programmed to routinely sample
the phototransistor converting the detected value to a digital
representation through the built-in analogue to digital con-
verter. These samples were stored and once the rolling average
of the 20 previous symbols was deterministically higher than
the average of the 50 prior symbols, this would signify the
message preamble has been detected and initiate recording
of all subsequent samples. Configuring the microcontroller to
sample the phototransistor every millisecond meant that for
each transmission period 50 samples would be taken. Through
analysis of each of these groups of samples, a long or a
short pulse would be determined.Once the user positions their
smartphone camera flash over the phototransistor and initiates
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Phone Model
Set
Light
(ms)
Actual
Light
(ms)
Set
Light
(ms)
Actual
Light
(ms)
Set
Light
(ms)
Actual
Light
(ms)
OnePlus 5T 50 56 30 36 10 16
Google Pixel 3 50 55 30 35 10 14
Nexus 6P 50 54 30 34 10 14
Sony Xperia XZ2 50 54 30 34 10 14
Motorola Moto G4 50 55 30 35 10 15
TABLE I
PHONES TESTED FOR LED RESPONSE TIME
the process, the app creates a binary string containing the
preamble, credentials, and cyclic redundancy check (CRC).
First, one second worth of preamble is added to the string, then
an Appkey is securely generated using well-established crypto
APIs [27]. The AppKey and previously received AppEUI are
converted to a binary format, and a 16-bit CRC applied [28].
This result is then appended to the preamble string to create
the overall message string. The app then schedules a series
of delayed tasks, each staggered by 50 ms, to light the
camera flash either for a long or short pulse, depending on the
corresponding bit in the message. Concurrently, the Android
app also initiates a TLS connection to register the device on
the LoRaWAN application server using the phone’s cellular
connection to transfer the matching credentials, and upon
successful transfer deletes the local copy.
The firmware on the sensor device would know what data
it is expecting from the flashing light. Therefore, after the
initial preamble message, the sensor device knows the message
length without requiring synchronisation. Consequently, after
the expected period has elapsed, the received CRC is validated
against the generated one. If the message is successfully
validated, the credentials will be extracted; otherwise, the
sensor device will reset and continue waiting to be configured.
Using the received credentials a LoRaWAN join request will
be attempted. If successful, the application server issues an
acknowledgement to the smartphone. If no such acknowledge-
ment is received, potentially due to credentials mismatch in
the join request, the app will reset and start flashing the same
message again, until a successful acknowledgement is received
or the programming is cancelled. The receiving device will
validate the CRC for each received mesage, and if the CRC is
validated the credentials are saved otherwise the device con-
tinues listening. Once the message is complete the companion
app may also automatically detect additional information about
the installation, and feed it back to the application server, for
example, the GPS location of the installed site.
VI. ANALYSIS
During a full system test, the created LoRaWAN sensor
device was provisioned in 17.1 seconds, without the need
for specialist tools or knowledge on the part of the phone
user. This was broken down into 1 second for the preamble,
12.8 seconds for transfer of AppKey, AppEUI, and DevEUI,
0.8 seconds for transfer of CRC check, and 2.4 seconds
for saving the credentials to the microcontroller, checking
Fig. 4. LoRaWAN Sensor Board Featuring an LED Diode for Key
Transfer
Task Time (seconds)
Preamble 1
Key Transfer 12.8
CRC Transfer 0.8
MCU Processing 2.4
Total 17.1
TABLE II
TRANSFER AND PROCESSING TIME OF SENDING CREDENTIALS FROM
SMARTPHONE TO SENSOR DEVICE
the CRC, joining the LoRaWAN network, and issuing a
confirmation message to the Android handset, and is shown
in Table II. LoRaWAN 1.0 was used for the implementation,
but LoRaWAN 1.1 would be compatible with a slightly longer
programming time due to the addition of the Network Server
Key.
The programming application, which was ran an OnePlus
5T, required minimal CPU resources (approximately 1% of
CPU), and the whole process took 956,416 us of processor
time, with CRC generation and AES key generation taking
12,452, and 1,237 us respectively. The application also only
required 80mb of RAM to operate, with 8.2 MB of code, 31
MB of graphics, and 30.4 MB of native C/C++ code used
to interact with the underlying hardware. This meant that the
resource requirement was low, and the majority of modern
phones would be able to run the application. Another area of
consideration is the energy usage. Although the energy impact
of running the application itself was minimal, it requires ≈ 1.7
mAh of energy to illuminate the LED [29] depending on the
exact number of ones and zeros in the message. Comparing
this energy usage to the capacity of modern mobile phone
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batteries, would allow for an estimated 1000 devices to be
programmed before the phone would need to be charged.
The system was implemented using LoRaWAN 1.0, as this
is the most common implementation at the time of writing [1].
However, as the proposal can transfer arbitrary data, the setup
procedure can be modified with a software update to improve
device longevity. This could involve using LoRaWAN 1.1 or
adding additional security keys to the microcontroller itself.
For example, although LoRaWAN only natively supports AES
128, the MSP430FR6989 contains an AES 256 hardware
accelerator, which could encrypt the payload before passing it
to the LoRaWAN module for transmission. The move to AES
256, although not required at time of writing, may become the
norm with the increase in viability of quantum computers [30].
Utility companies, in particular, would benefit as they require
equipment to be operational for decades.
While an additional component (a phototransistor) is an
additional cost it is a low-cost at less than 5% of the cost of
the raw materials of the device, and additional software would
be required to interact with the sensor device this is a minimal
addition, the cost of the change would be shared between all
of the required devices. Therefore, the financial considerations
are met. The provisioning software only runs immediately
after the device was reset and be disabled afterwords. The
phototransistor circuit can also be disabled to save power after
provisioning; the ability to disable IO pins is inherent in the
MSP430 microcontroller and requires no additional hardware.
The expected impact on battery life is, therefore, negligible,
meeting the low energy considerations.
To test the reliability of the proposed system in different
conditions the PCB sensor device was programmed in a
laboratory in a variety of conditions from brightly lit during the
day to evening conditions with artificial light. In all cases, the
system was easily able to distinguish between the LED flash
and background light. A feature of the PWM implementation
means that the proposed design is both hardware and software
agnostic, any mobile phone featuring a flashlight can be
reliably used to program devices without having to re-calibrate
any equipment, as the light sensor is self-calibrated through
measuring the ambient light and then recording any values
consistently higher.
As the installation process for these devices is accessible
and straightforward, it allows individuals without specialised
tools or training to install them, reducing the cost and time
associated with creating the network as a whole. Particularly
for utility networks, blank LoRaWAN devices could be stored
in maintenance vehicles and as maintenance engineers carry
out their daily tasks they could also be deploying sensing
devices. This would allow for a more rapid deployment and
would not require employing specialists to visit various loca-
tions. Moreover, if the central key server was compromised,
devices could be re-keyed faster, using this larger network
of people, than the traditional design of sending each device
to the manufacturer. Members of PNDC have evaluated the
proposed provisioning mechanism and have acknowledged the
significant advantage of not connecting laptops to devices, the
provenance of which is often difficult to determine especially
when relying on third party contractors.
The proposed design has an apparent limitation where a
mobile data connection is required to transfer the matching
credentials to the LoRaWAN server. However, in this situation
an installer has two options. If they are aware of the lack of
mobile coverage they can program the device while approach-
ing the installation site. Alternatively as the LoRaWAN device
is programmed to repeatedly attempt to join the LoRaWAN
network, the installer can generate the required credentials
locally, and transfer the keys to the LoRaWAN device and
delay sending of the matching credentials to the LoRaWAN
server until IP connectivity resumes. To test for this scenario,
the OnePlus 5T was placed into flight mode, and the in-
stallation procedure was started. The smartphone successfully
transferred the credentials to the LoRaWAN device and once
flight mode was disabled the LoRaWAN device successfully
joined the network. Next the light was artificially obstructed
to intentionally corrupt the message and cause the CRC to
fail, resulting in the device resetting and waiting for a valid
configuration. At this stage the Android application had not
received a confirmation therefore it started transmitting the
credentials again to the waiting LoRaWAN device. These
programming decisions meant that even without an immediate
mobile connection devices were still able to be programmed.
A. Security Analysis
The proposed key transfer system only alters the method for
generating and transferring key into the LoRaWAN module.
Therefore, this section will explore the benefits and limitations
of that method, and the security features of LoRaWAN itself
will not be considered. As the credentials are transferred
using visible light, it would be possible for an attacker to
record the deployment using a high speed video camera to
decipher the key. Security in visible light communications
is an evolving field [31]. However, due to the contained
nature of the proposal, only using a single fixed intensity
transmission LED and a receiving diode, this is an on-going
research question [32].
Given the predominantly unattended nature of LoRaWAN
devices, an attacker could also factory reset a device and
attempt to program the device themselves. However, without
a corresponding key held on the LoRaWAN server, the join
request would fail and prevent the device from joining the
network, meaning no malicious data would be injected into
the network.
A physical attack could result in a malicious actor obtaining
one of the development organisation’s smartphones capable of
programming devices, and therefore adding new devices to the
system. However, this can be prevented by using a passcode or
biometrics, a common protection scheme used to secure other
systems [33]. Moreover, once such a device is reported missing
or tracked as unaccounted for through find my phone or similar
scheme, it can be blacklisted. Additionally, this would have
minimal effect on the existing network as keys only remain on
the smartphone until they can be transferred to the LoRaWAN
server, and the API on the server only accepts adding keys,
with no provision to extract keys.
Another potential attack would be malicious applications
running alongside the provisioning application. The installed
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keys only remain on the device until they have been securely
transferred to the LoRaWAN server, at which point they
are removed. Modern mobile applications also benefit from
built-in security features such a sandboxing to prevent other
applications on the installer’s phone from extracting the keys
while programming the device. Smartphones also have a well-
established set of API for cryptographic operations to ensure
sufficient entropy generation for strong key generation [27],
and present less of a risk than laptops.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our system allows non-specialised individuals to easily
program low-cost, low-performance devices which commonly
rely on symmetric-key cryptography, such a LoRaWAN. The
security of these devices depends on the cryptographic keys
installed, and therefore should not be configured with de-
fault or easily guessable keys. For large scale deployments
particularly in critical national infrastructure such as utilities,
the cost and security of a deployment is critical. Therefore,
two considerations are the cost of deployment and its re-
silience. The cost of deployment is a factor of requiring
internal specialists to program devices, while the resilience is
a factor of how quickly the network could be recovered from
a compromise. Simplifying the installation process allows
the configuration workload to be distributed across various
parties, reducing cost and time associated with installation,
and allowing the network to be re-keyed faster. The system
removes the complexity overhead associated with setting up
devices securely, reducing the incentive to deploy devices
using default or easily guessable credentials. Moreover, since
the system does not require any credentials to be pre-loaded
into the devices, the credentials cannot be targeted before
installation, meaning devices can be freely distributed without
fear of the keys being intercepted. The distributed nature of
the installation process also means that if a malicious attacker
wished to compromise a large number of devices, they would
have to visit each location or influence various employees.
As the system uses a smartphone, which is very common
and can generate suitably random keys, the additional cost
of the hardware on the IoT device is minimal and requires
few resources of the micro-controller. Therefore, the system
alleviates some of the concerns for deploying sensor networks
in real environments as the cost is reduced, while improving
security, and if system is compromised it can be re-keyed.
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